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Abstract 
For a lot of researchers, international migration has particularly undergone a change during recent decades. In 2006, the recently 
released report by General Secretary of the United Nations on international migration and development suggested a "new era of 
mobility" which is characterized mainly by a non-permanent, or “circular migration”. Although the impact of circular migration 
on development is far from being determined, a current literature review suggests a growing optimistic tendency towards 
development. This optimism is based mainly on downfall of old migration structure in which emigrants are considered "a loss" 
for their countries (Southern country) and immigrants are therefore "won" by the country of destination (Northern country), 
entering through a direct influence of brain drain i.e. depreciation of human capital and consequently reduction of the economic 
growth of developing countries. In fact, today, emigrants and their children are key players in the development plans of many 
developing countries. In addition to the induced effect of brain drain as a stimulus to domestic education, the value of emigrants 
comes generally from their contribution from far (diaspora option), and also the huge benefits of their return back home (return 
option). Thus, circular migration implies a “brain drain” followed by a “brain gain” (feedback effect) where we find both the 
diaspora option and especially the return option, from which the economies of developing countries can benefit in terms of 
economic growth through technology transfer of their nationals in the North, including remittances, links to international trade 
and foreign investment and diaspora networks (diaspora option). Also another advantage is the physical return of nationals 
(return option). 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
  The relationship between the emigrations of qualified persons or brain drain and the development of countries of 
origin was the subject of many studies and analyses. At this level, different conflicting signs were identified, so it 
has become a question of empiricism. Thus, more precisely, while focusing on the impacts of the qualified people 
emigration on economies of countries of origin, particularly the southern countries, as countries which suffer the 
most from brain drain, it is possible to classify these effects into three categories: a direct effect, an induced effect, 
and a feedback effect. The direct effect, negative or unfavorable, is the depreciation of the human capital which 
hinders reduction of the economic growth. The induced effect, positive or favorable, consists in the fact that brain 
drain is a stimulus to domestic education. Whereas, with the feedback effect, it is about an indirect effect of brain 
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drain, a brain gain, with two options linked to it: diaspora option and return option. These latter can constitute 
channels of international technology transfer from countries of the North, or more precisely technology and 
expertise taken by expatriates and nationals to the Southern countries, on the one hand through the remittances, the 
links with the international trade, the foreign direct investment and the diaspora networks (Diaspora option), and on 
the other hand, through physical return of the expatriates (Return option). This last point will occupy a dominating 
place in our work insofar as it makes it possible to discover even to confirm another channel of technology transfer 
from North to South, out of the traditional channels commonly recognized as the international trade and the foreign 
direct investment. Hereby, the core question which arises at this level is the following: Based on whole set of effects 
of brain drain from the South to the North on the Southern countries, can we still consider that this phenomenon is a 
plague for the Southern countries that has to be solved? 
2. Direct effect of brain drain: Depreciation of the human capital and reduction of the economic growth  
     The emigration of skilled workers has been the subject of a great analysis and a great debate since the 1950s and 
1960s. More precisely, essays on the migration and the development go back to the late 1960s. Important 
economists, thinkers, politicians, entrepreneurs of the private sector and academicians expressed in a repetitive way 
their sights on the fatal consequences of brain drain associated with the qualified human emigration and the 
deterioration of national competitiveness in the developing countries resulting from this phenomenon. Indeed, in a 
static model, Grubel and Scott (1966) have already implicitly put forward the idea of brain drain showing that the 
effects of the emigrations on the income per-head depend on the emigrants’ productivity. More recent contributions 
of so called “growth literature” have underlined this point: as education affects positively the growth, qualified 
emigrations have a negative effect when depreciating the human capital stock in their country of origin1. Within this 
framework, the neoclassical economic growth models2 showed that brain drain has hostile effects on the 
development of the country of origin. In particular, high levels of the qualified emigration slow down the economic 
growth and harmfully affect the remaining skilled workers. Consequently, poverty and inequality increase. 
Moreover, the more recent economic theory, i.e. the new growth theory or the endogenous growth theory3 also 
foresees that a high qualified emigration slows down the economic growth rates. Indeed, a study finds that a 
reasonable human capital in a society has positive effects on the productivity and the growth. Therefore the 
departure of highly-qualified emigrants causes work vacancies and reduces the production in specific sectors of the 
economy. A study on selected 111 countries in years between 1960 and 1990 found that a one year more in 
educational scale of the labor force of a nation increases the production per worker by 5% to 15%. Reciprocally, the 
low education levels can slow down the economic growth, damage the gains of the slightly qualified workers and 
therefore increase poverty. Besides, Carrington and Detragiache (1999), Docquier and Marfouk (2005), OECD 
(2005), and Dumont and Lemaitre (2005) contributed to the largely accepted concept in politics according to which 
the emigration has a negative impact on the economic performance in the country of origin. This phenomenon was 
defined as “brain drain”, a negative characteristic which would prevent the development in the least developed 
zones in the world. In the same way, for Hansen and al., in 2002, the data study was Latin America and the 
Caribbean clearly illustrate that the emigration of “highly educated population” is a critical problem for the two 
areas. That obviously creates a challenge for the countries of Latin America and Caribbean since their human capital 
stock is steadily taken away. It is about a highly complex problem, which is due to a multitude of factors…. That 
involves the majority of countries in the area, particularly Mexico and Colombia, where a clear emigration of 
qualified population results in an export rather than an import of high-tech knowledge. Elsewhere in the area, 
particularly in Chile, Brazil and Costa Rica, brain drain is less apparent, but all countries of Latin America and 
Caribbean do not seem to profit from the current move of qualified work. Lastly, according to Meyer (2003), 
independently of the term used to describe the phenomenon of brain drain, the asymmetry of the brain circulation 
creates shortage of human resources in the developing countries. Lowell, Findlay and Stewart (2004) quoted studies 
suggesting that up to 30% to 50% of the population of the developing countries trained in Sciences and 
Technologies lives in the developed countries. That has a clear impact on the competence basis of the developing 
 
1 The least developed countries are slightly equipped in competences. Consequently, the international migration of qualified people from and to 
these countries can hugely affect the human capital stock. 
2 Bhagwati and Hamada (1973). 
3 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Topel (1998). 
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countries, on their absorptive capacity and on their possibilities of technological catch-up. This effect is particularly 
strong in the Third World; the majority of them are very slightly equipped in competences. 
     Consequently, brain drain is perceived as a phenomenon which must endeavored to correct the negative effects. 
Moreover, according to Hansen and al. (2002), one of the challenges usually faced by the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean is how to slow down the emigration of highly-qualified graduates. Within this 
framework, since the beginning of the 1960s, brain drain was identified as a problem against which policies must 
treat and fight by a voluntarist decision-making strategy. At this level, to favorably change the movement and the 
asymmetrical distribution of talents, developing countries must set up daring and creative strategies which may be 
supported by national policies to provide educational opportunities of good quality, to build research centers and 
industries, and to durably support these strategies financially. In other words, deprived of most of their most able 
and most fertile spirits, the developing countries are long in constituting the human capital necessary to the creation 
of knowledge. To reverse the movement and to make the intellectual richnesses distributed better in the world, the 
developing countries must apply daring and new strategies supported by national policies, which aim at providing 
training possibilities worthy of what is done best in the world, to set up research centers and development industries, 
and to finance these strategies. It is the way followed by Brazil, China and India, who ensure from now on a first 
order or world class formation in the crucial fields for their development, like biotechnology and computer science, 
and who, in parallel, invest in R&D. Consequently, only a small proportion of the most graduate elements leaves the 
country because the opportunities offered in the R&D sector allure the local candidates and attracts even foreigners. 
Moreover, among the remedies which were tried to face brain drain, we find taxation (compensatory financial 
measurements), regulation of flows through international standards, and emigration control. Indeed, taxation 
received a strong attention in the second half of the 1970s and the early years of 1980s, but it lost its attraction in the 
end of the 1980s. Concerning the flow regulation through international standards, it was proposed by organizations 
inside the United Nations system, but it was not implemented because developed countries, as countries of 
destination, generally still apply selective immigration policies with an interest for highly qualified labor. 
     In spite of what precedes, the emigration of skilled workers continues to exist and tends even to rise in the last 
decades. Moreover, regarded as an evil to fight at all costs during the 1960’s and 1970’s, the perception of brain 
drain has improved for a few years. So many authors noted that human capital exodus was always seen by the “brain 
drain” traditional literature as a plague for the developing countries. More recently, it was commonly sustained that 
the emigration -even of the highly qualified- can result in good outcomes. Indeed, according to Johnson (1967) and 
Berry and Soligo (1969), the global well-being is improved by a reasonable choice of the highly-qualified emigrants 
to look for more important incomes abroad. Moreover, the new literature concerned with international migration 
proposed theoretical models where emigrations of skilled workers can have positive effects on the country of origin. 
Moreover, the more sophisticated dynamic models showed that the beneficial effects of the emigrations of highly 
qualified workers can overwhelm the negative effect. The two principal channels for such effects on the developing 
countries are more important motivations to acquire education (induced effect) and technology transfer through 
brain gain (feedback effect). In other words, the emigration of the skilled labor of a country can play a potential role 
in any development of this latter and can be a cause of positive externalities; consequently this can be achieved 
through two ways. The first way is related to the acquisition of additional qualifications and the increase in the level 
of ex-ante education. The second way is related to brain gain with all that it can cause in term of technology transfer. 
Due to the availability of limited data, these points were mainly unexplored until now at the empirical level. 
However, Bugamelli and Marconi (2006) found a positive and statistically significant effect of the emigration of 
highly qualified workers on the GDP in the country of origin. This result is not limited to the poor or small countries 
or to the countries with higher emigration rates.    
3. Induced effect of brain drain: Stimulus to domestic education 
  Although Faini (2002) found that the emigration rate among the educated individuals is slightly and negatively 
correlated with the higher schooling rate at home, the probability of emigrating, which goes side by side with 
competences of the individual, would induce an additional investment in the education4. Indeed, the possibility of 
emigration towards countries with higher wages can stimulate the natives to pursue a higher education preventing 
 
4 Mountford (1997), Beine and al. (2001 and 2003), Mariani (2004). 
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them to pursue a more paying job abroad, and the domestic schooling rates can consequently increase. Thus, the 
contribution of the skilled workers in the country of origin increases5. As a result, the economic growth of the source 
country can be stimulated. Therefore, the level of the post-emigration capacities will be improved leading to an 
economic growth. Within this framework, as a sample of 50 developing countries, Beine and al. (2003), by using 
data of Carrington and Detragiache (1998), found a positive effect of the emigration of skilled workers on the 
human capital investment in the country of origin and a positive relation between the economic growth and the 
educated people rate at home. All that suggests that there is an “optimal level of emigration” or an “optimal brain 
drain”, neither too large nor too small, which generates an interest of further higher education and encourages the 
economic growth in developing countries. In other words, a certain extent of emigration can be a benefit for 
developing countries. It results in a larger schooling rate in domestic education. However, if the emigration is not 
beneficial, there will be less motivation to pursue education. Moreover, an increasing qualified emigration can have 
an opposite effect. 
     Bugamelli and Marconi (2006) found that indeed, the qualified emigration rates can positively affect economic 
growth, which goes beyond the larger attempts to acquire education, according to Beine and al. (2003), including the 
feedback effect of the qualified emigration or of the brain drain. This result is robust for the developing countries or 
for the countries with exceptionally high emigration rates.  
4. Feedback or indirect effect of brain drain: Brain gain 
     The model which was used to describe and explain why brain drain, defined as a permanent loss for one’s 
country of a qualified migrant attracted by a magnet of “periphery” towards the countries of the “center”6, proves 
less and less operative to apprehend the contemporary scientific migratory phenomena. Thus, there was in the 
literature a progressive replacement of the term “brain drain” by that of “brain mobility”. The “brain mobility” is 
more and more registered in terms of membership at an international scientific community in a general context of 
emergence of a science-world and a global economy. Thus the practice of the scientific activities is no longer linked 
to the nation and therefore its networks became necessarily mondial.  
     Within this framework, since brain drain is almost inevitable, a new wave of thought gained ground in the last 
decades, which significantly changed the range of the concept of “brain drain” by that of “brain gain”. Indeed, 
although the migration of qualified and educated human resources from developing nations to developed nations 
was negatively identified as brain drain for a long time, a serious problem affecting the developing countries 
capacity to develop, a brain drain of which some countries are victims becomes a brain gain for the countries which 
benefit from it. This new line of thought led a growing number of developing countries to consider their qualified 
diaspora as an asset which can be beneficial for their development.  
      Altogether, the policies adopted by the developing countries, with an interest to the emigration of their highly 
qualified citizens, are summarized through two fundamental approaches, which are also important and would not be 
seen in contradiction one with the other: the first approach, the brain drain approach, is focused on the negative 
effects of the emigration, i.e. a lack of competences for the source country; the second approach, the brain gain 
approach, stresses the positive aspects of brain drain and opportunities of using this highly qualified diaspora for 
national interests.    
    The international mobility of skilled workers highlights the feedback effects which generally result in favorable 
economic results. How? Moreover, technology is contained in the human capital, and the technology diffusion then 
requires a communication between the agents. At this level, Arrow (1969) showed the importance of the 
interpersonal communication in the facilitation of the technology diffusion. This communication can be remote, 
lying within the scope of the diaspora option, as well as face to face, lying within the scope of the return option. So 
in the recent years, two alternative strategies emerged and they are associated with brain gain: the “diaspora option” 
and the “return option”. More still, the feedback effects of the brain drain do not only include technology transfer, 
but also extend to the remittances. More precisely, there are two feedback effects of the qualified emigration: the 
emigrants bring back their competences and their work experience from abroad, allowing to improve productivity of 
 
5 Mountford (1997). 
6 Many works of the 1960s and 1970s are recognized in such a definition of brain drain, like Yesufu (1966), Watanabe (1969), Godfrey (1970), 
Truscott (1971), Bernard (1971) and Abdollahi (1979), as well as more recent works still such as Washington (1980), Fyodorova (1981), and 
Mahajan and Sudarshan (1985).        
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their country of origin. Moreover, the expatriates who remain abroad transfer funds as well as knowledge or 
technology to their countries, thus improving their productivity and their economic growth. Altogether, according to 
Khadria (2007), the source Southern countries suffering from brain drain are supposed to draw in return three types 
of economic benefits: the remittances, the technology transfer and the return of workers with improved competences 
from the host countries in the North back to their native countries in the South. Consequently, according to Burns 
and Mohapatra (2008), the diaspora is regarded as a brain bank. 
 
4.1. Diaspora option 
       
     Even if the emigrants are a permanent loss, their backward links with their source country can offer significant 
benefits. This backward link causes a return of knowledge and technology7. Moreover, Rauch (2003) claimed that 
the diasporas «should be especially adept at transferring technology» because they «avoid language and cultural 
barriers to diffusion knowledge». The technology transfer, as an integral share of the diaspora policy, improves the 
economic growth. Then, within this framework, the final objective of the diaspora option is to find ways by which 
the expatriates would be effective and productive to develop their country of origin, excluding any temporary or 
permanent physical return. At this level, in addition to the financial transfer, namely remittances, which can help to 
reduce poverty and support the economic growth, the emigrants and the diaspora communities are triggers for 
international trade and foreign direct investment. Moreover, many communities who live abroad often establish 
associations and partnerships to tackle the social and economic problems in their country of origin. More precisely, 
from another angle, the diaspora option affirms that thanks to expatriates, the country can have access not only to 
their individual knowledge but also to the socio-professional networks in which they are inserted abroad. By 
showing positive effects of these economic links, many national governments sought ways to more involve emigrant 
and the diaspora communities in the development schemes. Thus, altogether, the emigrants and diaspora 
communities can use their financial and intellectual resources to help to reduce poverty, strengthen the private sector 
and improve competitiveness in their countries, by making major contributions to the technological progress there. 
 
4.1.1. The remittances 
     To recover the economic losses faced by countries of origin as a result of the emigration of highly educated and 
qualified individuals, some attempts are made to pay back these countries. Some fees could compensate the amounts 
of money spent on training centers. Another way is to establish funds to finance training courses or to get a part of 
benefits from institutions hiring talented emigrants. These institutions are required to pay a certain amount 
calculated on the basis of benefits. These revenues would be collected by taxation in the country in which emigrants 
live and work. They could be transferred to domestic country to be deposited in accounts established to promote the 
research and development. Other ways allowing the mobilization of the remittances to the developing countries can 
be evoked, namely: 
 
4.1.1.1. The mobilization of remittances for consumption purposes 
    The majority of the people emigrates to work and send a part of their gains to their families at home. The volume 
of remittances is used for consumption (better nutrition and health) and also investment in the human capital 
(education), but it has no visible effect on exports, employment and domestic production. That led to market 
volatility and inequality. As far as poorer families are concerned, consumption can have a positive influence on 
standards of living and educational opportunities8. At this level, the use of the remittances for consumption can 
attenuate the poverty-related problems, without fully providing the means to escape poverty. So the families have 
become dependent on remittances to cover their expenses.  
     Although most remittances are sent by emigrants to meet their families’ needs, diaspora communities are not 
satisfied because they are looking forward to making their countries’ economies more developed. So the recent 
empirical literature has concluded that remittances have “GDP multiplier effects” which increase the national 
income9.  
 
 
7 The principal proof of the contributions of the diaspora to the technology transfer appears in the case studies. 
8 Sander (2003). 
9 Taylor and Adelman (1995). 
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4.1.1.2. The mobilization of remittances for productive purposes 
    The impact in terms of development of remittances would be to channel the funds towards the productive 
investments, i.e. towards the financial investments (savings) and the development of the firm. At this level, the 
billions of dollars sent by the emigrants are largely recognized as a decisive economic factor in certain developing 
economies. Despite the fact that remittances are meant to help the poor families, some researchers sought ways to 
mobilize a larger part to productive activities with the creation of income and job vacancies. In other words, the 
remittances by the emigrants back to their native country are considered crucial factors for economic growth in 
many developing countries. They provide financial resources which not only reduce poverty but also boost 
investment in the private sector. In the late 1990’s, Yemen, among 20 developing countries, received the greatest 
incomes from their expatriate citizens. At this level, the contribution to the GDP is classified of less than 1% for 
Brazil to 24% for Yemen10. 
       
4.1.1.3. Remittances and technology transfer 
     Saravia and Miranda (2004) suggested that the innovative mechanisms to make use of remittances transferred by 
emigrants abroad would be used to help the creation of a knowledge-based industry in the developing countries, 
through knowledge and technology transfer. How? 
     Remittances make investments more affordable, and therefore promote technology diffusion. Moreover, they 
could encourage technology diffusion by solving credit constraints for households and by encouraging 
entrepreneurship11. Moreover, remittance flows have also extended the banking services to previously unserved, 
often rural sectors, including microfinance, often by using innovative technologies. This has served both households 
and firms to benefit from financial services12, and therefore purchase and invest in technology. Lastly, remittances 
have also allowed domestic banks to establish links with banks in developed countries. In turn, such relations have 
resulted in transferring technology as banks in these developed countries have helped their local partners to update 
their systems. In that case, they could deal with for example money-laundering and terrorism in developed countries.  
 
4.1.2. Links with international trade and foreign direct investment 
     There has been recognition of the role of emigrants and diaspora communities in the facilitation of trade and 
investment towards their countries. While doing so, diaspora could contribute to the private sector growth and 
consequently to the technology transfer to his country of origin.  
     Within this framework, on the one hand, Gould (1994), Lloyd (1996), Head and Ries (1998), Saxenian (1999), 
Vertovec (1999) and Stalker (2000) found a statistically significant relation between emigration and trade: emigrants 
can encourage the trade in their country of origin. Moreover, according to Rauch and Trindade (2002), 60% of the 
increase in the bilateral trade in the various products within Southeast Asia can be allotted to the ethnic Chinese 
networks. Moreover, a research made by OECD on the immigrants in three key receiving nations and their source 
country has found a long run increase in the exports and the imports between them during the 1980s. More 
precisely, research has found that the transnational communities stimulate the imports of their country of origin. 
Moreover, a literature exists on the consequences of an increasing diaspora on the promotion of international trade. 
So, a Canadian study found in the 1980s that any increase of 10% in the number of emigrants of a given country was 
accompanied by an increase of 1% in the exports to this country, and an increase of 3% in the imports coming from 
it. Also, Head and Ries (1998) examined the links between the Canadian trade and 136 countries by taking into 
account the origins of the immigrants from these countries in Canada. The two authors found that the qualified 
emigrants have a more large impact on the Canadian trade than the impact that refugees have. Indeed, their 
evaluations suggest a very great effect, in such way that the unfolding of the qualified immigrants of East Asia in 
Canada increases the imports of East Asia coming from Canada of almost 75%13.  
In the other hand, Bugamelli and Marconi (2006) tried to identify the mechanism behind the technology transfer 
improving the growth. Their preliminary exercises showed that the positive effect of the qualified emigrations is in 
relation with FDI flows, which are largely recognized as an important channel for the technology transfer. This 
result complement in an interesting way a recent proof of Kluger and Rapoport (2005) on the positive effects of the 
 
10 World Bank (2003). 
11 Puri and Ritzema (1999), World Bank (2006), Fajnzylber and Lopez (2007), Woodruff and Zenteno (2007).   
12 Gupta, Pattillo and Waugh (2007). 
13 For a literature review in the context of the East Asian emigration of skilled workers, see also Lucas (2001a). 
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qualified emigration on FDI flows. Moreover, according to Wei (2004), in 2000, China received 41 billion dollars in 
the FDI, half of which can originate in its diaspora abroad. Moreover, the highly qualified diaspora of countries such 
as India have contributed to the development of information technology sector14 and to the FDI in its country of 
origin. The external FDI flow from the United States has been linked to the mass of emigrants of the country of 
origin15.  
 
4.1.3. Diaspora networks 
    The diaspora networks aim to establish and spur the communication and the exchanges, and therefore strengthen 
bonds between expatriates and to bind them to their counterparts in their country of origin. Economic, political and 
social developments have been a top priority in countries of origin through diaspora networks. In order to make sure 
that those objectives are achieved, the members of the network engage themselves in various activities. For 
example, they organize different educational, social and cultural events. So these development projects are concrete 
samples of the role played by expatriate nationals in knowledge and technology transfer from the most industrialized 
countries -in which they work- towards their country of origin. However, there is no convincing evidence about the 
projects number and the success degree they try to set up.  
 
4.1.3.1. Diaspora networks and technology transfer 
     A lot of professional and skilled workers of many developing countries live abroad, so this could be a negative 
aspect of brain drain. Some others think rather of the positive aspects. Better competences could be a benefit, 
through technology transfer. Many mechanisms of technology transfer exist. In addition to those already seen 
(remittances and links with international trade and FDI), these mechanisms also include the diaspora networks. So 
the diaspora networks were created to spur regular contacts, opportunities for businesses and knowledge transfers 
with researchers, scientists and entrepreneurs in the country of origin. More precisely, for skilled expatriates, the 
“diaspora option” counts mainly on the creation of networks which gives knowledge back to the country of origin, 
i.e. which facilitate technology transfer. In other words, the expatriates organize networks which stimulate backward 
knowledge flows and enhance collaboration with the researchers in source country16. According to Meyer and 
Brown (1999), formal networks have a clear objective to spur knowledge and technology diffusion. 
     The Internet played a very important role in this field. Most diaspora networks have a discussion forum or a 
newsletter, that is to say a paper or an electronic version, to spur the communication between the subscribers of the 
network and to keep them in touch with what is going on at home. Consequently, the mechanisms of technology 
transfer include the efforts to attract a digital diaspora through web-based portals, which take account of a sharing of 
knowledge between different parts. Altogether, Brown (2000) identified at least 41 e-based diaspora networks for 30 
different countries, which were founded during the 1990s. The increase of the diaspora networks, in particular in 
sciences and technologies (S&T), during the last decades in the developing world indicates a new tendency. These 
networks tend to being rich agents of talents with high concentrations of members having advanced degrees. 
Admittedly, the evaluation of the effects of these diaspora networks is not easy, but we can safely say that they 
undertake the facilitation of links which are able to help economic development. More precisely, these diaspora 
networks reverse the brain drain phenomenon, facilitating the knowledge transfer from qualified expatriates back to 
their homeland. 
The diaspora networks are classified into 5 categories: 
 Student/scholarly networks; 
 Local associations of skilled expatriates; 
 Expert pool assistance; 
 Developing intellectual/scientific diaspora networks; and 
 The Transfer Of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) program of The United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP): it was introduced in 1977. The program tries to bring the expatriates’ 
knowledge, expertise and experience back to their homeland. Indeed, the transfer of knowledge through 
expatriate nationals program of the United Nations development program help highly qualified expatriates to 
come back to their country of origin for short visits, which usually last between three weeks and three months, 
 
14 Kapur and McHale (2005b), Pandey and al. (2006). 
 
15 Javorcik, Ozden, Spatareanu and Neagu (2006). 
16 Kaplan (1997), Brown (2000). 
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during which the expatriates engage in various developmental projects or undertake teaching missions in local 
universities.  
     Moreover, network members engage themselves in conferences, seminars, workshops, etc. Besides, particular 
networks such as the Tunisian Scientific Consortium (TSC) were established. They have their own periodicals in 
which they publish articles and books written by network members. They diffuse the information and research 
results, and initiate dialogue and discussion between the network members and their corresponding counterparts at 
home. Also, the exchanges taking place between the members of the network and the national community can be of 
other types: scientific meetings, electronic data interchange or training courses. The latter do not always come out 
with tangible, visible or immediate results and cannot meet any statistical status. That’s why it is difficult to decide 
on success of the diaspora networks taking into account their impact on the development of the country of origin. 
However, that does not mean that those exchanges are useless. 
 
4.1.3.2. Examples of the diaspora networks 
     A number of increasing initiatives were taken during the last years by several countries to identify, mobilize, 
organize and reconnect their expatriate researchers with the scientific community present on the national territory, of 
which here are some examples. 
     Within the framework of the network approach, among different countries, Colombia has probably been the 
country which offers one of the most advanced and promising examples, with its network “Red Caldas” of the 
expatriate researchers, implemented for a few years. More precisely, the “Red Caldas” network of Colombia was 
established with the assistance of the government in 1991. This network joins the members of the Colombian 
intellectual diaspora, between them initially, in the different places where they live, and with their counterparts 
living inside the country itself. The “Red Caldas” network consequently intends to be an extension of the national 
scientific community out of the borders, and an anchoring for it in the world internationalized science. However, if 
the idea is simple and tempting, it conceals a great complexity and important difficulties to concretize it. The first 
difficulty lies in the constitution of the diaspora: the “Red Caldas” network is being slowly and gradually built, 
because the identification and the localization of the Colombian expatriate intellectuals are to be made from the 
beginning. A second difficulty is to manage to gather these individuals by local “knots” and to organize relations 
with Colombia. For people having left Colombia since more than 30 years, an identification with the relative stakes 
to national development is not automatic and immediate. There is an important work to mobilize this volatile 
population in a collective work. Lastly, it is hardly easy to put into distance communication the authorities and the 
people who were unaware of themselves or who lived in distinct worlds before creation of the network. An 
electronic forum allows the circulation of information among all the members of the network who are connected to 
Internet. In spite of the difficulties of its implementation, the “Red Caldas” network works and develops. So the 
“Red Caldas” network has been one of the first diaspora networks having succeeded in the promotion of a 
collaborative research between the domestic scientists and the Colombian researchers abroad, through workshops 
and symposiums, joint research programs, visits of researchers, scientific events, publications and research and 
training opportunities17. More precisely, for example, French and Franco-Colombian researchers come to ensure 
training courses in Bogota, the Colombia’s capital; the Colombian intellectual community in New York collects 
scientific works and equipment to be sent to Colombia; the one in Belgium organizes and carries out conferences 
cycles on the scientific cooperation between the European Union and Colombia, etc. Through all these actions, the 
“Red Caldas” network is going to be ever structuring and extending itself. It now constitutes the most developed 
version of a “diaspora option” of brain gain, which attracts more and more countries hoping to capitalize on their 
intellectual resources placed outside. 
By taking account of the fact, as it was previously indicated, that there was a proof that 41 e-based diaspora 
networks are representing the diaspora communities all over the world, other examples of diaspora networks, in 
addition to the one of Colombia, are to be evoked. These examples include the Brain Drain Project in Serbia and the 
South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA). At this level, one of the best known diaspora networks binds the 
qualified people living abroad who were interested in the contribution to the economic and social development of 
South Africa with the local experts and projects. The South African Network of Skills Abroad is an example of an 
active network with more than 2000 members in more than 57 countries, with an expertise in hundreds of 
specializations in a number of professional sectors.  
 
17 Chaparro, Jaramillo and Quintero (2006). 
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Moreover, the repertories of national researchers working abroad were worked out or are in the phase of constitution   
in the cases of Chile, Colombia, South Korea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, India, Israel, Romania, Singapore and Taiwan. 
Several conferences were organized during the last years in a number of countries of the East (like Romania in 
1994) and of the South (like Morocco in 1993 and Colombia in 1994) with an aim of gathering the scientific 
diaspora dispersed throughout the world and of arousing collaborations with the national scientific community. 
Several conferences were also organized in countries with strong concentration of the scientific diaspora abroad. It 
is the case of Eritrea which organized a conference in the United States in early 1995 with an aim of mobilizing its 
expatriate scientists in this country.  
A big number of expatriate researchers associations have also recently developed on the initiative of these 
researchers, of which for example are the Ethiopian Researchers Association in the United States and the Scientists 
Latin-American Association. Various associations have established for several years summer schools or joint 
research programs, like the one of the Uruguayan researchers in biochemistry centered at the Institute Pasteur of 
Paris or that of the Franco-Vietnamese friendships.  
Non-governmental organizations also invest themselves in these efforts of mobilization of the expatriate researchers. 
It is the case of the Third World Academy of Sciences (TWAS) and the Third World Foundation of North America. 
This last foundation lodged by the University of Maryland in the United States undertook to identify all expatriate 
researchers working on the American territory while starting with the researchers originating from India. 
Lastly, less formal networks played an important role in the transition of South Korea, Taiwan and China from 
developing economies to high-income economies.  
     Many countries have established diaspora networks with similar characteristics and structures. It is a proof that 
the diaspora option is an efficient strategy. To our knowledge, no network has been dissolved; the fact that diaspora 
networks still exist today, although some of them are not so active based on their activities and projects, means that 
the objective of their creation is still found, that’s why they still have some support. Moreover, diaspora networks 
have achieved their initial objective of mobilization of highly qualified expatriates for various successes.  
 
     All in all, the “scientific diasporas” represent a new approach of brain drain. For developing countries, these 
diasporas constitute an enormous potential of additional resources. Moreover, they are important resources for an 
effective and beneficial cooperation between these developing countries as countries of origin of these diasporas and 
the highly industrialized countries as host countries: on the one hand, the country of origin profits from an additional 
capacity brought by its expatriates; on the other hand, the host country has nothing to lose because expatriates 
scientists and engineers produce inside its territory. Being implied in their homelands, diasporas can be “agents of 
change”, introducing new ideas and resources which are able to catalyze progress in stagnant economies. The 
objective of implication of these emigrants in the development process would be the same as any development 
agenda, namely promote a long run and sustained economic growth. However, these benefits of the “diaspora 
option” differ between the developing countries. Indeed, the benefits of reverse capital flows, trade with the 
countries of origin and technology transfer, as identified in India and Philippines, are small in the majority of the 
least developed African countries.  
 
4.2. Return Option 
 
4.2.1. Return option and technology transfer 
 
4.2.1.1. The permanent return of permanent immigrants and technology transfer 
 
4.2.1.1.1. Direct investments 
     It has been suggested over the years that returnees might be a direct source of investments. A certain proof is 
accumulated through the years indicating a larger tendency than on average, the immigrants come back to choose an 
entrepreneurial activity. More recently, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) noted that more than 50% of the Turkish 
returnees have started entrepreneurial activities. Moreover, Black and al. (2003) also showed the importance of 
savings to create investment opportunities with the return. The two authors support that the individual immigrants 
having generated a capital surplus, although abroad, will be able to launch themselves a new company when 
returning. Moreover, Ilahi (1999) found that the amount of savings is positively correlated with the choice of self-
employment at home (after return), while Mesnard (1999) found that most of entrepreneurial projects undertaken by 
Tunisian returnees have been completely financed by savings abroad. 
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4.2.1.1.2. Human capital transfer 
      In addition to the direct investments, the returnees also bring crucial human capital when coming back. The 
Barrett and O' Connell’s study (2000) has concluded that “the returned migrants accumulate skills and competencies 
while away that are rewarded on return to the home country”. More recently, Sjenitzer and Tiemoko (2003) have 
concluded that “migration, followed by a return to self-employment and the creation of a small business, can 
represent a potential strategy for poverty alleviation”. 
 
4.2.1.2. The permanent return of temporary immigrants and technology transfer 
     The current literature also examines how the temporary returning immigrants contribute to the inflow of direct 
investments and human capital, however with the least degree. The case study of Basok (2003) on the Mexican 
seasonal emigration in Canada found that the Mexican migrating workers have launched small businesses and 
invested in agriculture at home. Other investments were made in certain “non productive” activities of the economy. 
However, they encouraged human values such as work and made people look for better perspectives like the 
improvement in career perspectives. The return phenomenon of the immigrant in the current literature was 
resuscitated with a positive attitude and a national pride. In the current discourse, the return is not only supposed as 
permanent but somehow temporary and even cyclic. 
 
4.2.1.3 .The temporary return of permanent immigrants and technology transfer 
 
4.2.1.3.1. Direct investments 
     Saxenian (2002), in a Silicon Valley’ study, has found that many immigrants from China and India are regularly 
keeping touch with their native countries via businesses objectives. Moreover, according to Saxenian (2005): “these 
cross-regional technical communities have the potential to jumpstart local entrepreneurship, and they succeed over 
the long term to the extent that they build alliances with technical professionals, businesses, and policymakers in 
their home countries”. 
 
4.2.1.3.2. Human capital transfer 
     Apart from an inflow of direct investments, the temporary returnees generate also an inflow of human capital. 
Lowell and Findlay (2001) noted that certain researchers prefer to use the term “brain circulation” to qualify this 
type of return. For example, Saxenian (2005) noted that there is “substantial evidence that the `brain drain' from 
developing countries such as India and China has been transformed into a more complex, two-way process of ‘brain 
circulation’ linking California’s Silicon Valley to select urban centers in India and China”. Moreover, Martin (2004) 
observed that perhaps the United States and Asian countries may witness a new era characterized by “brain 
circulation”. 
 
4.2.1.4 . The temporary return of temporary immigrants and technology transfer 
     The literature stresses also the tendency of temporary immigrants to come back at home only temporarily. In this 
case, the temporary immigrants only come back to emigrate again: at this level, it’s mainly about a negative 
circularity. As far as development is concerned, the temporary return in that case has a negative impact. However, it 
is worth being noted that remigration is not fully negative for emigrants themselves. As Ellerman (2003) noted, the 
decision to work abroad is sometimes a “career choice” and not just a “temporary measure to acquire capital or 
knowledge”. Based on that, the permanent return before the retirement would be considered by immigrants 
themselves as “a failure in their career choice”. 
 
     Generally, the contribution to the development process of the migrants who return, temporarily or definitively, to 
the country will depend on their aptitudes and their degree of preparation, as well as the socio-economic and 
institutional conditions in their country of origin. The return of immigrants to the country will influence, according 
to any probability, more concretely the development process if, at an individual or collective capacity, by the means 
of their knowledge network, they succeed in benefiting from the social capital of their country of origin and of the 
country of destination. All in all, immigrants can be factors of economic, technological and social changes. 
 
4.2.2. Examples of the Southern countries 
  It is not by chance or coincidence that the countries which benefit most from return option are India and China, 
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as the big developing countries. In addition, some other countries, like the new industrialized countries of Asia 
including Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan18, may also benefit from return option insofar as these countries have 
Sciences and Technologies and industrial sectors who are already enough advanced and where the qualified 
population has many possibilities to pursue the innovation and the production. So the empirical literature focused on 
the role of return option to improve the competences levels, stimulate technology transfer and promote capital 
accumulation. The rising economies, particularly in Eastern and Southern Asian countries since 1990s19, may be 
served as good examples. However, the discourse on the return option has covered other parts of the developing 
world. Ireland is another given example. Returnees are behind its economic miracle: the Irish economy grew by 
8,4% from 1993 to 2001, that is to say three times the remainder of the European Union. Moreover, McCormick and 
Wahba (2002) showed that the qualified immigrant, while coming back to its country of origin, Egypt, establishes a 
new company to make use of new sophisticated technologies, as far as the qualified immigrants, who are skilled in 
using these new technologies abroad, can directly transfer their knowledge back home. More recently, according to 
McCormick and Wahba (2003) and Wahba (2007), the immigrants coming back to Egypt are often better qualified 
than non immigrants. They seem to be more practical and initiative-taking because of their long stay abroad. Lastly, 
according to Logan (2009), in the case of the brain gain back to the South, the African country obtains some 
competences from expert returning to his country of origin, and can use his abilities for national development. 
     Consequently, southern countries need the repatriates to bring back technology in order to spur economic growth. 
Thus, if the southern countries of origin need their nationals to come back and bring technology, they must develop 
an adequate scientific, technological and businesses environment which will provide remunerative opportunities for 
the return of individuals having improved their competences abroad.   
 
4.2.3. Policies encouraging the circular migration 
     The onset of the brain gain depends mainly on the development level of the country and also on the strategies and 
the long-term planning to reverse migration. At this level, the governments of the countries of origin have taken 
most initiatives encouraging circularity and aim at return of the highly qualified permanent immigrants. Indeed, 
more precisely, in the past four decades approximately, certain governments of the South initiated policies which 
attract the returnees directly through the supply of a whole set of incentives, or indirectly through the supply of a 
dual nationality and flexible residential rights. 
 
4.2.3.1. Direct policies: The reverse brain drain model 
     Apart from material and non-material incentives, and in order to encourage the return of the highly qualified 
nationals, the majority of the governments of the South establish a lead coordinating body, research institutes and/or 
science parks, as well as networks and a database. In doing so, they connect expatriates to local employers and 
colleagues.  
 
4.2.3.1.1 . Offer of material and non-material incentives 
     Some southern governments implemented initiatives to encourage probable returnees. Taiwan and South Korea 
set a return program to identify “high flying individuals”. The number of years since PhD, the current position, the 
number of published papers and the relevance for the national priorities were important criteria to categorize 
returnees. The governments of these two concerned countries were given to the selected individuals the 
opportunities to research and to start their own firms, moving costs (which was dropped in the 1990s), salary top-up, 
subsidized house-purchase mortgages, and the like. There were also programs tending to attract nationals at home 
for one-year shorter visits. Likewise, in 1989, China20 also established a new service center for returnees. It provides 
allocations for the housing of returnees, duty-free purchases of computers and automobiles, and offers of return 
airfares for self-financed students. 
 
4.2.3.1.2 . Lead coordinating body 
     To organize their initiatives, a lead coordinating body was assigned or created by some governments of the South 
like those of South Korea and Taiwan. For example, the Ministry of Science and Technology in South Korea fully 
 
18 Charum and Meyer (1999). 
19 Saxenian, Motoyama and Quan (2002). 
20 It should be noted that China endeavors today to set up strategies to make return its researchers, more than it seeks to structurally profit from its 
scientific diaspora. 
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cooperated with the National Youth Commission (NYC) in Taiwan. The latter received a constant budgetary and 
administrative support from the government. In the same way, Uruguay created the National Commission for the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM). It was designed to reintegrate returnees, especially scientists and 
professionals. Likewise, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia created the Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs 
General Directorate, and the Ethiopian Expatriate Support and Coordination Office as a part of continuous efforts to 
build the country. Lastly, Ivory Coast established a department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deal with 
expatriates.  
 
4.2.3.1.3 . Research institutes and/or science parks 
     Korea Institute for Science and Technology was a pioneering experience. It was established in 1966, and then 
followed by several other R&D institutes and engineering schools concentrated in the Seoul Science Park and 
Daeduk Science Town. Similarly, the Taiwanese undertook to strengthen higher education institutes by supporting 
centers such as the Hsinchu Science Park. These research institutes attracted the highly qualified expatriates and 
attempted to keep them at home or at least to join professional associations of expatriate Korean or Taiwanese 
scientists and engineers. It was the same tendency in China, where science parks, specific development zones and 
high-tech zones were established in Beijing as well as in the majority of the Chinese provincial cities since the 
1990s. While being based on experiments in Asia, Hansen and al. (2002) noted that in 1995, the Colombian 
institution of promotion of sciences “Colciencias” has established centers with the objective to stop emigration and 
to attract the return of highly qualified expatriates. The institution selected four centers, and that choice was based 
on training researchers as well as on contribution to their respective scientific fields. Hansen and al. claimed that 
“given the successful outcome of similar policies outside the LAC region, such an initiative is expected to reduce 
the current brain drain in Colombia”. 
 
4.2.3.1.4 . Set up and maintain networks and database 
     Governments in South Korea and Taiwan have established networks and maintained database. They have 
attempted to help their citizens’ inside and abroad. Expatriates and researchers abroad could get information about 
public and private sectors in their countries of origin. It is also an opportunity for domestic employers in South 
Korea and Taiwan to know more about highly qualified nationals abroad. Likewise, Colombia started a similar 
network in 1992, which has spread in 30 countries. It has been working on joint research projects, in biotechnology 
and robotics. The cooperation has mainly been between the European and local universities. Uruguay has also the 
same program to assimilate a part of its 400.000 highly educated immigrants. In this context, another country from 
Africa has tried to connect expatriates with local experts and projects. South Africa has established the South 
African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) to achieve this objective. The SANSA is maintained by the National 
Research Foundation, which is a government’s national agency responsible for promotion of research and 
innovation. In fact, the SANSA is built on a database, which contains updated information on addresses and 
qualifications concerning South Africans living abroad. Consequently, there will be a reception of South African 
graduate students in the laboratories or the training programs, a participation in the formation or research with the 
South African counterparts, a facilitation of businesses contacts or an imitation of research and commercial projects.  
 
4.2.3.2. Direct policies: Business model 
     The southern governments have also shown the interest in the attraction of returnees with the financial capital for 
investment. For example, Hsing (2003) noted that since the late 1980s, the Chinese government has offered a lot of 
investment packages to Chinese abroad as privileges to wealthy diaspora returnees. The author stated another 
example of Taiwanese government and its ability to attract the Taiwanese investors: “They have simplified the 
process and regulation of investment and made concessions in taxes and fees for Taiwanese investors. Such 
flexibility… was crucial to the success of Taiwanese investment”. The former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was 
another concrete example. The country encouraged the return of wealthy expatriates, although few, who could 
afford to buy entire companies.  
 
4.2.3.3. Indirect policies: Dual nationality and flexible residential rights 
     Governments of the South also adopted indirect policies which might lead to return of qualified talents. The 
adoption of dual nationality and/or flexible residency rights are given as prerogatives. They allow a much easier re-
entry to the country of origin. According to Jones-Correa (2001), in 2000, 10 developing Latin American countries 
have in fact implemented these indirect policies. They are Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
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Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. Generally, in the developing world, there is an 
increasing interest about the benefits related to these indirect policies.  
 
     Concerning the results of these policies of repatriation, as Cervantes and Guellec (2002) commented: “the harsh 
reality is that only a handful of countries have been successful in luring their talented émigrés back home”. Within 
this framework, the “dragons” of South-East Asia are the champions of brain gain. They organize systematic 
reintegration for their nationals trained abroad. It is consequently about a physical transfer of the person, from his 
laboratory in a country of the North to a new establishment, reconstituted, in his country of origin. Among the latter, 
South Korea and Taiwan were leading countries which set up the most efficient policies of repatriation21. These two 
countries, in addition to Malaysia, were more recently followed by India and China. In all these cases, it is about 
voluntarist and incitative policies which engage to preserve the autonomy of the researchers and their membership in 
the international scientific community. Moreover, according to Goudineau (1994), Singapore also developed an 
extremely voluntarist policy, seeking to create a scientific “compost” for some of its selected researchers in order to 
form a small number of “poles of excellence”, by authoritatively making back home students sent to be formed 
abroad and by surrounding them by high expenses recruited experts. However, there were several cases of failure. 
At this level, the least developed countries would consequently aim short term visits by qualified professionals, 
which can mainly include teachers, professors and engineers. Teachers and professors give courses, and engineers 
provide specific inputs in sectors concerned with their expertise field. These actions could achieve a significant 
success related to development projects and programs. The qualified people selected can achieve better results 
compared to other international professionals because they are more familiar with the local circumstances in their 
country of origin. 
 
     The policies of repatriation are not only and exclusively the field of the governments.  
 
4.2.3.4. The role of international organizations 
     International policies put a bigger emphasis on brain gain via the returns. The interest was related to the 
maximization of the brain gain while working with the diaspora, spurring incentives for the qualified immigrants to 
come back in a permanent way. The International organization for migration was in the foreground of these efforts. 
For example, the IOM (2002) implemented programs of return of talents to Africa such as “The Return of Qualified 
African Nationals (RQAN) program”, and later “The Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) program”, with 
the main objective of “mobilizing, and promoting the utilization of highly qualified, qualified and skilled personnel 
in the development of African countries through voluntary programs”22. The IOM also launched similar programs in 
Latin America and Asia, respectively “The Reintegration of Qualified Latin American Nationals (RQLAN) 
program” and more recently “The Return of Qualified Afghans (RQA) program” in Afghanistan. Generally, the 
IOM have worked in collaboration with the governments of the countries of origin to select candidates, employ 
them, finance their return, and help them to the reintegration into their societies. To attract potential returnees, some 
motivations have been introduced. They include tax exemptions, financial assistance with moving costs, seed capital 
for starting a business, and even citizenship rights for spouses and children. 
    Although the success degree of these programs is still very debatable, the IOM has for example succeeded, 
between 1983 and 1999, in relocating about 2000 expatriates to 11 African countries. A similar example is the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) on the Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals 
(TOKTEN), which encourages professionals, holders of master’s degree at a minimum and an important work 
experience, to go back home for a short period of time to transmit their skills gained abroad. TOKTEN has some 
stories of success, particularly in the West Bank and Gaza. Most senior advisory were trained abroad. They became 
active in governmental and nongovernmental institutions. There have been more than 400 Palestinian expatriate 
professionals who participated in that program, of which 18% decided to have a final return.  
 
4.2.3.5. Policies of the developed countries 
     While the admission rate of permanent immigrants in developed countries has slowed down, the number of 
temporary workers grew more quickly during the XXIst century. That is a result of a new emphasis on the return 
 
 
21 Chang (1992), Yoon (1992). 
22 Wickramasekera (2002), pp. 11-12. 
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option as a part of effective migration policies instituted by the countries of destination of the North in Europe and 
America. Within this framework, in the recent years, the international immigration policies of the developed 
countries of the North showed a tendency to even encourage the highly qualified immigrants of the developing 
country of the South not to settle in a permanent way in the destination country, but to shuttle between temporary 
modes of stay and return. Thus immigration came to replace continuously the older generations of human capital by 
younger ones, and consequently to keep the young profile of age of the immigrants, particularly to neutralize their 
ageing own structures of population. Thus, the age is the primacy of the temporary emigration. 
     The incentives for the immigrants for a return at home were offered by some European countries. Indeed, France, 
Italy and Germany have provided training, technical assistance and loans to the immigrants23. For example, France 
has provided loans to the Malian and Senegalese immigrants to establish companies in their countries of origin. 
Unfortunately, such programs are not very efficient because of the small size of these programs, the lack of 
experience in the establishment of companies and the weak economic conditions at home. Therefore, all these 
factors need to be taken into account in order to have a favorable impact of such programs on the return of the 
immigrants and on the impact of their return on the domestic economies.  
 
     In all, diaspora and return options together help to promote the technology adoption. The political commitment of 
the diaspora in his country of origin can also improve the local technological absorptive capacity through the return 
and by exerting from afar a pressure on the politicians of the home country. At this level, for example, the 
Taiwanese diaspora and the Taiwanese returning migrants were proved to be channels of technology transfer: 
according to O'Neil (2003), there are, in 2000, 289 companies in the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park in 
Taiwan, of which 113 companies were launched by Taiwanese educated in the United States. At the same time, the 
diaspora networks played an important role in the transition of Taiwan from a developing economy to a high-income 
economy. It’s the same for South Korea and China.  
 
     Brain gain, through the diaspora option and the return option, being political answers to the highly qualified 
emigration or to the brain drain, can be associated with other answers to constitute the “six R”, which are: 
1. Return of migrants to their country of origin; 
2. Restriction of international mobility: Many developing countries have restrictive emigration policies, which 
consist in the restriction of the number of immigrants. That has been aimed at lowering competition for 
domestic workers; 
3. Recruitment of foreign migrants: When home countries run short of skilled workers, why not resorting to 
foreign workers? Therefore, governments followed new policies towards immigration. They are characterized 
by giving priority to the information technology skilled workers; 
4. Reparation for loss of human capital (Tax): It is about preferred economic prescription. It was implemented in 
the 1980s. The idea suggested that developed countries would compensate the developing ones for their losses 
of human capital. More precisely, emigrants directly pay taxes to their country of origin; 
5. Resourcing expatriates (Diaspora option); 
6. Retention through effective educational sector policies: To create a highly educated workforce, governments 
should have effective educational institutions, i.e. which retain graduates and post-graduates in the domestic 
educational system. If these graduates are fully aware to stay inside, emigration problems will be resolved and 
economic growth will be a certainty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 World Bank (2006). 
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5. Conclusion 
     Brain drain is indeed a model: it is used explicitly or implicitly as reference to a number of works on the North-
South relations and on geopolitics of Science and Technology. At this level, the brain drain experimented by several 
countries in the developing world can be transformed into a repatriation of knowledge and know-how, in particular 
when it is about a brain gain. For this reason, generally, the brain drain is not nowadays regarded any more as a 
plague which can affect the developing countries, especially if it is considered that the direct effect is dominated by 
the induced even feedback effect of the brain drain; what is not the case of the least developed countries for 
example, which are the most probable to suffer from brain drain. Anyway, by taking into account the importance of 
the local circumstances in the countries of origin, the key to the reduction of the brain drain costs and to the increase 
of the brain gain benefits is related to the economic and political conditions and the policies adopted in the home 
countries.  
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